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La Empresa colaborativa y ambidiestra
1. INTRODUCTION
What kinds of organizations can support high levels of performance 
in the contemporary world of work? As many observers have 
pointed out, work is increasingly knowledge-intensive, because 
knowledge is replacing land, labor, and capital as sources of wealth 
(Nonaka, Toyama, and Nagata 2000; Grant 1996). Moreover, work is 
increasingly solutions-oriented, because the interactive co-production 
of services is replacing the mass production of standardized goods 
(Applegate, Austin, and Collins 2006; Galbraith 2002). And finally, 
competition has grown more dynamic, less predictable, and more 
global. As a result, many organizations have found that whereas in 
the past they could focus on just one dimension of performance — 
either innovation, flexibility, and the exploration of new opportunities, 
or efficiency, control, and the exploitation of existing capabilities 
— today they must find ways to improve on both dimensions 
simultaneously. In other words, they must become “ambidextrous”. 
Achieving ambidexterity is difficult; some doubt it is even possible. 
Management theory teaches us that organizational performance is 
a function of the fit between the organization’s goal and its internal 
design — its structures of authority, staffing and compensation 
policies, decision-making systems, etc. An organization whose 
strategy requires excellence in innovation should adopt an “organic” 
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executive summary
This article aims to advance our understanding of the organizational prerequisites of ambidex-
terity. Ambidexterity is the ability simultaneously to exploit existing capabilities and to explore 
new opportunities. Prior research suggests that ambidexterity requires a strong bond of trust 
among the relevant actors. However, trust can also stifle innovation. We resolve this contra-
diction by developing a typology of trust, differentiating the traditionalistic (clan) type from the 
charismatic, contractual, and collaborative types, and we show how this last, collaborative type 
supports ambidexterity by its distinctive values (based on contribution to a shared purpose), 
norms (based on interdependent process management), and congruent authority and eco-
nomic systems. We illustrate our argument with a case study of Kaiser Permanente, a large 
health system in the USA.
resumeN del artículo 
Este artículo persigue avanzar nuestra comprensión sobre los prerrequisitos organizativos 
de la ambidestreza. La ambidestreza es la habilidad de explotar las capacidades existentes 
y explorar nuevas oportunidades de manera simultánea. Investigaciones previas sugieren 
que la ambidestreza requiere de una fuerte dosis de confianza entre los actores relevantes. 
Sin embargo, la confianza también puede axfixiar la innovación. Nosotros resolvemos esta 
contradicción desarrollando una tipología de confianza que soporta la ambidestreza por medio 
de sus valores distintivos (basados en la contribución a un propósito compartido), normas (ba-
sadas en la gestión de procesos interdependientes), y una autoridad y sistemas económicos 
congruentes. Ilustramos nuestros argumentos con un caso de estudio de Kaiser Permanente, 
una gran empresa del sistema de salud de EE.UU.ThE COLLABORATIVE, AmBIdExTROUS ENTERpRISE
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organizational form, whereas an organization aiming for excellence 
in efficiency should adopt a more “mechanistic” form (Burns & 
Stalker, 1961). Many management theorists have therefore argued 
that if an organization attempts to compete on two dimensions at 
once, it can achieve at best only mediocre levels of performance on 
either dimension.
Many organizations under performance pressure have sought ways 
of organizing that mitigate this trade-off. Early efforts in this direction 
took the form of partitioning the organization into functionally 
differentiated subunits: R&D units focused on innovation and 
adopted an organic form, and operations units focused on efficiency 
and adopted a mechanistic form. More recently, some 
firms have sought to develop ambidexterity by partitioning 
business units into business-line subunits, each with its 
full complement of dedicated functions — one subunit 
pursues innovation goals and is more organic, and the other 
pursues efficiency goals and is more mechanistic. And some 
organizations aim to develop ambidexterity more widely 
within the organization: they create functional subunits within 
which organic and mechanistic features are combined, and 
where, as a result, R&D units become more efficient in 
their innovation work, while operations units become more 
innovative in their efficiency-oriented work. 
However, any of these forms of ambidexterity can only 
succeed if the efforts of the differentiated subunits or roles 
are effectively integrated. If the people in differentiated 
subunits and roles focus only on their own parochial goals, if 
they hold each other at arm’s length and respond defensively 
to their partners’ needs, if they do not trust each other, then 
the organization’s performance will indeed be mediocre in both 
performance dimensions.
Trust is therefore a critical ingredient to successful ambidexterity. But 
not all trust is helpful in this context: some high-trust organizations 
are inwardly focused and resistant to change — creating a context 
hardly conducive to ambidextrous innovation. Ambidexterity depends 
on building a specific type of trust, one that is open and flexible. 
We call this this type of trust “collaborative” (Heckscher & Adler, 
2006). Collaborative trust is based on institutionalized dialogue 
and shared purpose. It differs from the three, more familiar forms 
of trust: the traditionalistic clan type based on status, loyalty, and 
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deference; the charismatic type based on an shared emotional bond 
to a transcendent idea and an exemplary leader; and the contractual 
type, both of whose variants (bureaucracy and market) are based 
on individual autonomy, financial incentives, and administrative 
authority. (This typology of trust and the corresponding organizational 
models builds on sociological theories of Weber (1978) and his 
typology of social action.)
It is important to discriminate among these types of trust because 
each supports a different type of strategic goal, as shown in 
Exhibit 1. Here we differentiate strategic goals depending on the 
importance they give to exploitation (extending existing capabilities 
via incremental innovation for greater efficiency and control) and/
or exploration (radical innovation for the creation of new capabilities 
and greater flexibility).
Exhibit 1. Different types of trust support different strategic 
goals 
Ambidexterity
Collaborative
Efficiency, control
Contractual-bureaucratic
Innovation, flexibility
Contractual-market or Charismatic
Stability
Traditionalistic
Goals:
Trust:
Exploitation
Exploration
Goals:
Trust:
Traditionalistic trust helps businesses whose goal is stability but 
handicaps those pursuing either efficiency or innovation. Charismatic 
trust facilitates intermittent radical innovation but impedes efficiency. 
Contractual trust encourages a commitment to performance relative 
to contractually specified rules and/or output goals: such trust 
can provide either efficiency/control (via a focus on rules in the 
bureaucratic variant) or innovation/flexibility (via a focus on outputs 
characteristic of the market variant), but not both at once. To achieve 
simultaneous improvements in both innovation and efficiency, 
organizations need a collaborative type of trust in which commitment 
is to contributing to fulfilling the organization’s purposes and to 
developing the best working procedures to that end.ThE COLLABORATIVE, AmBIdExTROUS ENTERpRISE
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2. A NEW MODEL OF ORGANIZATION — COLLABORATION
How then can an organization create and sustain the collaborative 
type of trust? The extent and type of trust in an organization are a 
function of organization’s characteristics in four dimensions. The two 
most obviously relevant are the organization’s shared values and its 
norms; but no less important are the organization’s authority and 
economic structures. (Here, we are adapting Parsons’ (1971) classic 
AGIL framework). Using this four-dimensional framework, we can 
contrast the collaborative model of organization with other, better-
known models by synthesizing the results of a considerable body 
of management research and the lessons of many organizations’ 
organization design efforts.
Values. In the values dimension, the key feature of the collaborative 
model is a commitment to values that privilege contribution to the 
organization’s shared purpose. As suggested above, this marks a 
strong contrast with the traditionalistic clan model, which places primary 
value on loyalty to the group; it contrasts with the charismatic model, 
which values the emotional bond to leaders and to the transcendent 
values they represent; it contrasts with markets, which value autonomy 
and pecuniary gain; and it contrasts with bureaucracy, which values 
conformance and control. These last two contrasts are particularly 
important: the collaborative model accords its highest praise not to 
people who “meet their numbers” but to those who are able to look 
beyond their specific roles and who do whatever is needed to advance 
the common purpose. We call this orientation the ethic of contribution.
Moreover, to sustain collaborative trust, this shared purpose must be 
rationally established — open to pubic debate and subject to regular 
review through participative and dialogical strategy processes. This 
differentiates collaborative values from those characteristic of the 
contractual model, where the organization’s purposes are dictated 
from above or by the market; from the traditionalistic model, where 
purposes are taken for granted; and from the charismatic model, 
where the commitment to purposes is emotionally rather than 
rationally grounded.
Norms. For any model to function effectively as a social system, 
its shared values (whatever they may be) must be buttressed 
by corresponding norms — that is, by behavioral expectations 
that guide working relations among people playing differentiated 
roles. Collaborative norms are distinctive in creating what we call 
interdependent process management, exemplified in processes pAUL AdLER & ChARLES hECkSChER
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such kaizen, process mapping, brainstorming, participatory 
meeting management, and multi-stakeholder decision-making. 
These norms enable people in differentiated roles and subunits 
to manage their interdependencies through direct dialogue; such 
dialogue is supported by formal procedures; and all these people, 
whatever their hierarchical level or affiliation, have a genuine voice 
in designing and refining these procedures. 
Interdependent process management buttresses with more formalized 
norms the “informal organization”, which has long functioned as a 
kind of hidden complement to formal bureaucratic mechanisms. Like 
bureaucracy, interdependent process management has standards, 
procedures, specialized roles, and authority ranks; but in the 
collaborative model these are used in the service of the shared 
purpose rather than as means of top-down control. In contrast to 
any of the other models, the collaborative model is in this way able 
to mobilize sizeable cross-functional and cross-unit teams towards 
the organization’s goals, and people can move more fluidly between 
such teams. (Ainamo 2007; Heckscher 2007).
Authority. Ambidexterity requires that contributors attend 
simultaneously to exploration and exploitation goals. When 
organizations attempt to orchestrate such efforts by relying on the 
familiar bureaucratic hierarchy of authority, the result is typically an 
overemphasis on just one of these goals. Sustained ambidexterity in 
any larger-scale organization therefore requires a distinctive authority 
structure — the matrix, with multiple accountabilities (Galbraith, 1994). 
Matrixed authority is difficult to sustain, and many organizations that 
have tried it have given up in frustration. However, the key reason 
for failure is not that the matrix violates some law of nature — its 
failures have been due to a deficit of collaborative trust. Competitive 
demands for ambidexterity increase the payoff to firms who have 
mastered this challenge. Indeed, among successful organizations, 
there has been an evolution over recent decades towards expanding 
the number of dimensions in the matrix (Heckscher, 2007; Galbraith, 
2008; Strikwerda and Stoelhorst, 2009).
To sustain the trust required for effective matrix structures and 
ambidexterity, the collaborative model relies on an authority structure 
that is both participative and centralized. Exploratory innovation often 
results from a highly decentralized structure in which people have 
room to experiment without prior approval from above; but if the 
organization as a whole is going to benefit from these exploration ThE COLLABORATIVE, AmBIdExTROUS ENTERpRISE
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efforts, some centralization is needed to ensure their strategic 
guidance and systematic exploitation. This tension can only be 
managed if centralization takes a highly participative form. Participative 
centralization may appear paradoxical if we assume that centralization 
and participation are polar opposites; but they are not. A collaborative 
enterprise coordinates activity across the whole organization – in that 
sense, it is centralized; but it achieves this result participatively, by 
involving those whose work is affected by the decisions. 
The resulting emphasis on interdependence contrasts with the 
market and bureaucratic models’ emphasis on dependence and 
independence. In a bureaucracy, each job has its own autonomous 
sphere of action, and higher levels establish the boundaries of 
autonomy for lower levels. When excessive centralization causes 
communications slowdowns and rigidity, many organizations 
respond by turning to the market model and creating independent 
business units. But this rarely solves the problem: it exacerbates the 
difficulty of achieving coordination and trust across the units. Many 
large corporations therefore go through cycles of centralization and 
decentralization in search of an elusive balance. A collaborative 
enterprise, by contrast, treats its components as interdependent: all 
its members must consider how their actions affect others who are 
engaged with them in pursuing the shared purpose. 
Participative centralization thus contrasts with the decentralized structure 
of authority of the contractual-market model, which supports exploration 
but not exploitation. It also contrasts with the low-participation, high-
centralization structure of the contractual-bureaucratic model, which 
support exploitation but not exploration. It contrasts with the low 
participation and low centralization of the traditionalistic model, which 
is characterized by “fiefdoms” of semi-independent, autocratic power. 
And it contrasts with the charismatic model, which is characterized by a 
low degree of functional specialization and a simple hierarchy centered 
on a leader from whom innovation flows. Each of these falls short in 
structuring the combination of creative exploration and disciplined 
exploitation that constitutes ambidexterity.
Economics. The economic dimension in organizations has two 
aspects: capabilities and incentives. As concerns capabilities, the 
collaborative model requires a “T-shaped” set of technical skills 
— deep knowledge in one’s own specialty combined with some 
knowledge of related technical specialties — and the corresponding 
process and social skills to enable effective teamwork. Such pAUL AdLER & ChARLES hECkSChER
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T-shaped skill sets afford the common ground critical in cross-unit 
collaboration and learning. The capabilities required in the other 
models are more narrowly specialized.
As concerns incentives, the collaborative model requires incentives 
that reflect the basic value-orientation of contribution to the 
organization’s purpose. Here, rewards are based on a mix of personal 
performance, team performance, and the entire organization’s 
progress towards its purpose. Insofar as the collaborative model 
differentiates rewards by individuals, the key criterion is the 
individual’s contribution to that purpose. Because formal supervisors 
cannot be aware of the entire range of activities of their subordinates 
when these latter are engaged on multiple projects and contributing 
on cross-cutting dimensions, collaborative organizations rely on 
multisource (“360 degree”) assessments. In both the criteria and 
process, the other organizational models have very different reward 
systems: the traditionalistic model relies on status; the charismatic 
model, on the leader’s approval; the bureaucratic model, on 
procedural conformance; and the market model, on market outcomes.
Inter-organizational relations. So far, our discussion has focused 
within the organization; but ambidexterity often also requires a 
collaborative approach to relations between organizations, whether 
these relations take the form of supply chains, associations, alliances, 
or regional clusters. Such relations often rely on traditionalistic ties based 
on loyalty, on charismatic ties based on personal appeal, on contractual-
market ties based on instrumental self-interest, or on contractual-
bureaucratic ties based on complex contracts: but they can also be 
based on collaborative ties grounded in shared commitment to common 
purposes. Even though collaborative ties are often undermined by 
inter-firm competition, it is this collaborative type that offers the greatest 
potential for inter-firm networks aiming for ambidextrous excellence in 
both exploration and exploitation (Hagel et al. 2010; Miles et al. 2009). 
3. THE COLLABORATIVE MODEL COMBINES MECHANISTIC 
AND ORGANIC FORMS
To return to the point made in the introduction, ambidexterity 
requires that firms somehow combine organic and mechanistic 
forms of organization. Building on the preceding section, Exhibit 2 
describes how firms can achieve this synthesis in a way that avoids 
compromising performance on either exploration or exploitation 
dimensions of performance.ThE COLLABORATIVE, AmBIdExTROUS ENTERpRISE
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Exhibit 2. Synthesizing Mechanistic and Organic forms
MECHANISTIC COLLABORATIVE ORGANIC
Rigid 
departmentalization
Employees have their own specialized tasks, but they 
focus on contributing to the common task and often 
go beyond their formal job descriptions
Cross-functional teams
Narrow spans
of control
There is a clear structure of authority and 
accountability, but is often multidimensional (matrixed) Little direct supervision
High formalization
Processes are formalized, but (a) they are also adjusted 
through teamwork and dialogue, and (b) they are 
constantly refined with the involvement of those doing 
them
Minimal formal rules
Clear chain
of command
Communication is organized according to purposes 
and projects, and who can best contribute to them; 
thus it often cuts across the formal chain of command, 
but is highly organized
Open communication 
network
Centralization
Centralized but participative: there is much local 
initiative and responsiveness but also strong overall 
coordination across the system. Decentralized initiative 
must be justified in relation to overall purposes
Decentralization
Low decision 
participation
Participation based on capacity to contribute to task 
or mission Empowered employees
This collaborative synthesis has not been well delineated in previous 
management scholarship — indeed, much of that scholarship 
denies the very possibility of such a synthesis. Mintzberg’s (1979) 
typology offers little hope for ambidexterity, since his “adhocracy” 
model is presented as an organic form “with little formalization” 
(p. 432). This kind of organization supports exploration much 
better than it supports efficiency and exploitation. Another popular 
typology, the Competing Values framework, also includes an 
adhocracy type, defined by an emphasis on flexibility (rather than 
control) and a strong external (rather than internal) focus (Cameron, 
1986; Cameron & Quinn, 1999; Zammuto & Krakower, 1991). (In 
other studies, the same quadrant is called “open systems” (Quinn 
& Rohrbaugh, 1981), “developmental” (Quinn & Rohrbaugh, 
1983), or “adaptable” (Denison, Cho, & Young, 2005), Worley and 
Lawler (2006). The Competing Values typology tells us little about 
how to design ambidextrous organizations that must be strong 
simultaneously on flexibility and control dimensions. 
Our collaborative model is closer to the “contextual ambidexterity” 
model proposed by Gibson and Birkinshaw (2004). They discuss 
four climate and culture features taken from Ghoshal and Bartlett pAUL AdLER & ChARLES hECkSChER
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(1997): stretch, discipline, support, trust. In their empirical research, 
they found that these four features resolved into two factors: (a) 
“performance management context” creating discipline and stretch, 
and (b) “social context” creating support and trust. Examining the 
component items, this framing seems to support the arguments 
of Blake and Mouton (1978) – good managers show concern for 
both production (discipline and stretch) and for people (support and 
trust). Our main thesis is that it is important to distinguish among 
the various types of “support and trust” because the different types 
assist with different strategic priorities.
There is some evidence that a collaborative form is not only a 
better mix, but also outperforms one-dimensional organizations at 
their own games. That is, an effective collaborative system is better 
at efficiency than a bureaucracy, because it engages members in 
continuous improvement and problem-solving; and it is better at 
innovation than a market or decentralized bureaucracy, because it 
coordinates knowledge more effectively across a wider scope. We 
will see this in the following case.
4. A CASE ILLUSTRATION: KAISER PERMANENTE
We can illustrate the features of the collaborative model with an 
example from the US healthcare industry – Kaiser Permanente. 
The US healthcare industry is a context in which ambidexterity 
has become a pressing priority. Healthcare delivery organizations 
need to be aggressive in exploiting evidence-based practices that 
will drive improvement in cost and safety and in assuring patients 
faster access and shorter hospital stays. Simultaneously, these 
organizations are under pressure to make radical innovations in their 
infrastructure (for example, with electronic health records), to stay 
abreast of rapid and radical innovation in diagnostic and treatment 
technologies, and to be flexibly responsive to the great variety of 
patient needs as well as the urgency of many of these needs.
One asset the healthcare industry can leverage in attempting to 
meet these ambidexterity demands are the shared values that have 
long guided medical practice: values focused on serving the patient’s 
health needs create a foundation of shared purpose characteristic 
of the collaborative model. In reality, however, the practice of 
medicine in the US has often combined this dedication with strong 
elements of the traditionalistic, contractual, and charismatic models 
(Adler et al., 2008). Traditionalistic elements have long been visible ThE COLLABORATIVE, AmBIdExTROUS ENTERpRISE
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in the professional loyalty that binds doctors together in defense 
of peers against criticism or interference by outsiders, and in the 
impact of status differences on many doctors’ interactions with 
nurses. Contractual-bureaucratic elements have been increasingly 
visible where government agencies or insurance companies dictate 
to doctors which tests and procedures they can use. Contractual-
market values increasingly encourage doctors to multiply tests and 
procedures to maximize their own income, even referring patients 
to imaging and surgery centers in which they have an ownership 
stake. Charismatic elements are visible where “star” doctors wield 
charismatic authority over peers, other clinical and non-clinical staff, 
and patients.
Kaiser Permanente (“Kaiser” for short) is one healthcare 
organization in the US that has long sought to encourage doctors 
to practice medicine in a more collaborative way. Kaiser is the 
largest healthcare provider and one of the largest healthcare 
insurance companies in the country, with nearly 9 million health 
plan members, 167,300 employees, 14,600 physicians, 35 medical 
centers, and 431 medical offices. It is organized as a consortium of 
the (not-for-profit) Kaiser Foundation Health Plan (insurance), the 
(not-for-profit) Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, and a set of affiliated 
regional Permanente Medical Groups (which are for-profit physician 
partnerships or professional corporations that do business almost 
exclusively with Kaiser).  
Unlike independent practitioners still common in the US healthcare 
system, Kaiser physicians are salaried members of a group practice. 
Doctors new to Kaiser go through a three-year probationary period 
during which they are regularly evaluated not only on their technical 
competence but also on their collegial relations with other doctors, 
the respect they show for other staff and patients, their willingness 
to contribute ideas and effort to improving the organization’s 
performance. Being salaried, Kaiser doctors are somewhat insulated 
from the market pressures experienced by physicians in private 
practice. On the other hand – and somewhat controversially – Kaiser 
doctors are expected to consider the economic consequences of 
their treatment decisions. Where many doctors in private practice 
have long refused any role in controlling healthcare expenditures, 
Kaiser doctors participate in that effort. 
Kaiser physicians are managed under relatively formalized 
procedures and authority structures; but Kaiser has sought to ensure pAUL AdLER & ChARLES hECkSChER
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that these systems support collaboration rather than a contractual-
bureaucratic model. Clinical guidelines illustrate the point. Where 
many doctors in private practice chafe under the bureaucratic 
constrains of medical guidelines imposed by government or 
insurance companies, Kaiser doctors collaborate with their Kaiser 
peers and with other clinical and non-clinical personnel to define 
guidelines. When the activity is entirely within purview of a medical 
specialty, the relevant group of doctors will develop these guidelines 
themselves. When the activity involves multiple specialties and 
other staff, these guidelines are developed with broader input and 
participation.
The collaborative model at Kaiser also encompasses unions 
and unionized workers. Unions are an essential part of Kaiser’s 
business, and Kaiser has developed a labor/management 
partnership that is unique in its scale and ambition (Kochan et al., 
2008; Kochan, Eaton, McKersie, & Adler, 2009). Most of Kaiser’s 
non-physician, non-managerial employees are unionized, and 
many of Kaiser’s “customers” — the members covered by Kaiser’s 
insurance plan and treated by Kaiser doctors — are unionized 
too. As a result, and unlike many other employers in the US, it 
is difficult for Kaiser to take an anti-union position without risking 
both a great deal of internal organizational turmoil and damage 
to their reputation in the target market. However, the unions also 
see that using their power in confrontational ways risks destroying 
Kaiser— even though, compared to other employers, Kaiser pays 
and treats its workers relative well. The parties recognized their 
interdependence in a landmark partnership agreement, included in 
the collective bargaining contract in 1997. The collaboration enabled 
by this partnership has become central to Kaiser’s efforts to meet its 
ever-intensifying ambidexterity challenges, providing a foundation 
for combining top-down initiatives by specialized technical staff (e.g. 
for new computerized medical records), and “bottom-up” input and 
involvement by a broad range of personnel (for local improvement 
projects), as well as extensive lateral learning (so that similar 
locations can share lessons learned). 
The labor/management partnership functions not only as a labor 
relations strategy but also as an operating strategy that shapes 
everyday decision-making and behavior across the organization. 
As a labor relations strategy, the partnership helps Kaiser meet 
its ambidexterity challenges through its reliance on “interest-ThE COLLABORATIVE, AmBIdExTROUS ENTERpRISE
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based bargaining” (McKersie et al., 2008). Management and labor 
negotiate to find areas where they can find common ground and win-
win solutions that create a bigger pie (“integrative” bargaining), while 
on other issues where there are no win-win solutions they bargain 
over the relative shares of the pie (“distributive” bargaining). Taking 
the integrative part seriously means that the union gets deeply 
involved in helping shape the organization’s goals as well as how 
it operates. Taking the distributive part seriously means that even 
as they engage with management on these issues, unions work to 
preserve and strengthen their capacity for independent action. 
As an operations strategy, the partnership helps Kaiser meet its 
ambidexterity challenges by supporting participative centralization 
across the organization. An entire hierarchy of joint labor/
management committees governs decision-making from the 
national, to the regional, down to the facility level. This hierarchy has 
progressively expanded downward to the work unit level. Starting 
in 2005, unions and management in each facility began to set up 
labor/management teams in every unit in every facility. Participation 
was voluntary, but by 2012, almost every department in the entire 
organization had at least one such team in place. These unit-based 
teams work on improvements that they see as most relevant to 
their work, choosing targets that contribute in some way to one 
of the over-arching strategic priorities defined by Kaiser’s “Value 
Compass”. 
The Value Compass nicely captures several of the key features 
of the collaborative model. First, it defines the shared purposes of 
the organization in use-value terms, that is, in terms that identify 
the specific contributions of Kaiser to society — “Best quality, best 
service, most affordable, best place to work” — rather than only 
in financial terms. Second, these goals were not dictated by top 
management; instead, they were jointly defined by management 
and unions. Third, the Value Compass is not a “vision” statement 
designed to galvanize emotional enthusiasm as we might find in the 
charismatic model; instead, it is a statement that defines in a rational 
way, thus open to discussion, the purposes of the organization. 
Finally, people at all levels are engaged in working out how they can 
translate the top-level Value Compass purposes into their local work 
processes, giving them a unity of purpose in their daily work and 
their daily improvement efforts. 
In the unit-based teams, unionized staff, management, and pAUL AdLER & ChARLES hECkSChER
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physicians cooperate in examining every step of the work process 
to analyze why and when and how people perform their tasks and to 
ask if there might be a more efficient and effective way to operate. 
(The collective bargaining agreement protects union members from 
being laid off as a result of any of these improvement efforts: where 
changes in services or technology have made jobs redundant, the 
agreement provides relatively generous provisions for retraining 
and a commitment to doing whatever is feasible to find employment 
elsewhere within Kaiser). Working in these teams, physicians 
have been challenged to give up their hierarchical, status-based, 
or charismatic authority and to work collaboratively with nurses, 
technicians, cleaners, and administrators. These latter categories 
of workers have developed new skills in problem-solving, leading 
meetings, analyzing work processes, identifying improvement 
opportunities, presenting cogent arguments in team meetings 
and bigger forums, energizing others to get involved, dealing with 
conflicting views and divergent interests, and understanding the 
business side of Kaiser and the economics of healthcare. 
This collaborative, ambidextrous organization has indeed seen 
dramatic improvements both in exploration and exploitation 
dimensions. Kaiser performs near the top of healthcare delivery 
organization in many of the key operational metrics (Schilling et 
al., 2010) (Whippy et al., 2011), and has developed an impressive 
capacity for radical innovation (Nelson, 2010). Surveys of worker 
attitudes conducted jointly by union and management show 
improved worker morale too, with widespread support for the 
partnership process and its outcomes (which have, in recent 
years, included wage and benefit gains as well as growth in union 
membership). 
5. WHAT DOES COLLABORATION MEAN IN A BUSINESS 
SETTING? 
Readers might reasonably ask themselves if this portrait of the 
collaborative model is utopian. Any capitalist business can only go 
so far in building and sustaining any type of cooperation, let alone 
this strong form we call collaboration. Pressures from the market, 
the competition, or the stock market can and often do destroy the 
possibility of cooperation. As a business, the organization’s goal 
is basically profit, not people. So when a market shrinks, or new 
competitors appear, workers are often laid off, teams are torn apart, ThE COLLABORATIVE, AmBIdExTROUS ENTERpRISE
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and people stop caring or trusting. Even when sales are growing, 
profit pressures often push businesses to cut costs, to cut corners 
on quality, and to ignore social and environmental externalities, and 
when workers see the firm doing any of these, they often withdraw 
their commitment and trust. There are therefore good reasons to 
be pessimistic about the prospects for sustained collaboration in 
business.
On the other hand, however, for a business organization to generate 
profits, it must deliver a service or product that people are willing to 
pay for. If the product is too shoddy or too expensive, if the service 
not flexible enough, if the business cannot innovate rapidly enough 
to keep up with the competition and with customer needs, then the 
business will fail. And without some degree of cooperation with 
workers, that outcome is almost inevitable. 
Businesses therefore have a real interest in maintaining cooperation 
— even if, at the same time they are constantly tempted to do things 
that will undermine that cooperation. This assertion may sound as 
if we are contradicting ourselves, but a moment’s reflection shows 
that it is rather common-sensical: the contradiction is in the reality 
of capitalist business. This contradiction is not, however, static: 
the balance in that tension shifts in favor of collaboration to the 
extent that the business conditions require ambidexterity. Here 
the organization needs much more from its employees than just a 
minimal degree of cooperation: its performance and very survival 
demands “all hands on deck” — the organization needs everyone’s 
improvement ideas, everyone’s willingness to find ways of doing 
things better and cheaper. Such organizations need collaboration 
rather than just reluctant compliance, and it becomes much more 
expensive for the organization to sacrifice cooperation for profit. 
6. PUTTING THIS IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
Going back to the 19th century, US industry was dominated by 
the traditionalistic model. But these traditionalistic organizations 
experienced great difficulty responding to changing market 
demands and technologies and even greater difficulty initiating 
such changes, because they had no systematic way of changing 
the methods dictated by custom. This rigidity was an important 
factor encouraging the rise of the contractual form, which enabled 
deliberately planned or negotiated change through a mix of market 
and bureaucracy. However, contractual relations proved too “thin” pAUL AdLER & ChARLES hECkSChER
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to support most day-to-day working relations, which cannot be 
reduced to predefined and measurable agreements. So many 
large businesses ended up with a hybrid of paternalist loyalty, 
bureaucratic formalism, and market flexibility. It is that mix which 
has been challenged in the past few decades by the increased 
pressure for innovation, improvement, and ambidexterity: this has 
led to intensified interest in the collaborative form.
Traditionalistic, contractual, and collaborative types of trust and 
organizational models trace a developmental sequence marked by 
increasing scope of innovation and choice. The traditionalistic model 
requires close adherence to concrete ways of doing things defined 
by the past. The contractual model allows a wider range of action, 
but it requires predefined agreements or rules with quantifiable and 
objectively observable outcomes. The collaborative model broadens 
the scope of innovation still further by enabling more continuous 
improvement and more flexible problem solving within the limits 
of agreed-on processes and missions. The charismatic model is 
also very effective in mobilizing support for radical innovation and 
change, but it is by nature ephemeral: charismatic organizations 
endure only by mutating into one of the other three models. 
(The sociologist Max Weber famously called this process the 
“routinization of charisma”). Conversely, as organizations progress 
from traditionalistic to contractual to collaborative, the less they 
need to rely on charismatic enthusiasm for their innovative drive.
The collaborative model has been around for a long time in 
embryonic form, in institutions peripheral to or outside the economic 
sphere — institutions such as science, universities, cooperatives, 
and voluntary cultural activities. What is new is that we are now 
seeing this model begin to take root in business enterprises at the 
heart of the modern economy. But in order for this model to flower, 
the grip of traditionalistic and contractual institutions will need to 
weaken and robust institutional form will need to found for the key 
features of the collaborative model. 
This evolution is difficult in enterprises that are under competitive 
economic pressure and that rely on wage labor. As noted in the 
previous section, performance pressures stimulate the emergence 
of this new, higher form of organization, even though these same 
pressures often undermine collaboration. Collaborative organization 
is therefore a precarious accomplishment, and progress in its 
diffusion is not a smooth or linear process.ThE COLLABORATIVE, AmBIdExTROUS ENTERpRISE
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